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FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

VOL. XXV, No. 7

NOVEMBER 30, 1945

CHINA'S INTERNAL STRUGGLE FOCUSES ON MANCHURIA

THE struggle for control of North China and Manchuria now developing between Chungking and the Chinese Communists is still in an early phase; whether the contending parties continue their hostilities or at some point reach a political working agreement. By the middle of November United States warships had moved over 100,000 Central Government troops to North China and landed them at such key points as Tientsin, Tsingtao and Chinwangtao. From the last-named port Chiang Kai-shek's forces, armed with lend-lease materials, have pushed their way into southern Manchuria with the ultimate objective of taking the rail hub of Mukden and the regional capital of Changchun. Although the Communists have strengthened themselves in recent months through the seizure of Japanese arms, technical superiority is clearly on the Central Government's side. This superiority is reinforced by the presence in North China of over 50,000 United States marines, who have made possible the entrance of Chungking divisions by holding certain cities for them until their arrival, jointly patrolling these centers with the Central troops thereafter, and guarding stretches of railway in the Peiping-Tientsin area.

NO QUICK DECISION. Despite the advantages accruing to Chungking because of current American aid, there is no reason to suppose that a military solution of China's political differences could be reached within a brief period. An all-out civil war would almost inevitably be a prolonged and unpredictable struggle—a fact which reinforces the suggestion made by Under Secretary of the Navy Artemus L. Gates at Tsingtao on November 18 that the American public ought to be more fully aware of the seriousness of the China problem. It is worth recalling that, during the last period of Kuomintang-Communist civil strife, fighting lasted almost ten years (1927-36).

Today, it is true, the Central forces are better

trained and equipped than before the war with Japan, but this is also true of their opponents. The Communists, who had less than 100,000 troops in 1937 and occupied a small, lightly populated region in the Northwest, now have many times that number of men and exercise political authority of varying strength in a large section of North China, as well as in parts of Central China and Manchuria.

BIG STAKES IN MANCHURIA. The magnitude of the military and political issues involved is indicated by the very size of Manchuria, which is almost as large as France, Italy and pre-1938 Germany combined and has a total population of over 40,000,000 people (of whom more than nine-tenths are Chinese). It is a territory of great natural resources and fertile soil, and its leading products include soy beans, wheat, coal, iron ore and shale oil. At the same time it has a more highly developed railway system than any other Chinese area of equal size and, as a result of having been harnessed to the Japanese war machine, is the outstanding industrial region of the country. (Manchuria's industrial power may, however, be reduced, if recent allegations of Russian removal of machinery prove correct.)

At no time in recent centuries has Manchuria been fully integrated politically with the rest of China. Under the Manchu Empire, it was administered separately as the ancestral home of the ruling Manchus and immigration from other parts of the country was restricted. With the founding of the Republic in 1912 Manchuria passed under the rule of local warlords, culminating in the "Old Marshal," Chang Tso-lin, and his son, "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, who succeeded him in 1928. Chang Hsueh-liang was attracted toward the idea of Chinese unity on a nationalist basis, but the Japanese took over his empire in 1931, and for the next fourteen years Manchuria experienced a separate type of economic and

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political development under Japanese control.

All these factors suggest that the forces making for Manchurian regional sentiment are likely to be strong, and that incorporation of the area into the pattern of a united China will not prove an easy task. In the months since the Japanese surrender no clear-cut information has been available concerning Manchurian political sentiment, but it will be important to see whether the name of Chang still carries any political magic. Chang Hsueh-liang himself has been kept in custody by the Central Government ever since he was involved in the seizure of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian in December 1936. But two of his younger brothers, Chang Hsueh-shih and Chang Hsueh-ming, are reported to be generals in the Communist forces in Manchuria.

MOSCOW'S STAND. The key position in Manchuria is now held by the Russians, who occupied the region after entering the war with Japan and, under the terms of the recent Chinese-Soviet pact, are to have special rights in certain Manchurian railways as

well as in Port Arthur and Dairen. Chungking has been anxious to secure Soviet backing for the entrance of Central troops into Manchuria by air and sea, since the land route now being used is not satisfactory for the movement of large forces. The course of the discussions has been unclear, but the Russians apparently are carefully fulfilling their agreement with Chungking under a policy of not giving aid to the Communists and of withdrawing Soviet troops from Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek has found, however, that the latter arrangement, which seemed desirable at the time of treaty negotiations as a safeguard against prolonged Russian control, no longer serves Central purposes. For under existing circumstances the Communists, who are close to key Manchurian centers, are in a position to take over many important points evacuated by the Russians. Chungking has therefore been seeking to induce Moscow to abandon its policy of neutrality and instead actively facilitate Central operations.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

DAILY CONTACTS IN EUROPE AID RUSSO-WESTERN UNDERSTANDING

LONDON.—Can the Western world find a basis for a workable understanding with Russia, or is a conflict between them inevitable? This is the urgent question that haunts a continent freshly ravaged by war yet already living in dread of a still more devastating struggle. To this question there are two possible answers. The Western powers could act on the assumption that an understanding with Russia is impossible. Then Britain and the United States should do everything in their power to pool their resources of money, goods, shipping and aviation, instead of competing with each other for possession of these sinews of modern war as they are doing today. They should also seek to obtain the support of the countries of western Europe—from Norway to France and Italy—and organize the resources and manpower of their zones in Germany into a front-line bulwark against Russia. Such a policy might prove in many respects feasible, but we must recognize that it is the policy advocated by Hitler and propagated by Goebbels, of girding Europe for a war on Russia. The alternative is for the Western powers to act on the assumption that, arduous as negotiations with Moscow will continue to be, it is essential for the security and stability of Europe that they should keep on trying to reach an understanding with Russia.

IMPACT OF WEST ON EAST. Actually, this would be the worst possible moment at which to isolate Russia or permit Russia to withdraw into itself, as it has shown signs of doing, for at this very moment the Russians, through force of circumstances, have had to come into much closer contact with the Western world than they had done since 1917. And, at the same time, the Western world, seeing Russians

at first hand, has had a better opportunity than since 1917 to appraise Russian ideas and practices by the harsh light of every-day life instead of the rosy glow of Utopian hopes. Not only in Germany and Austria, where the Russians must work directly with the Americans, British and French in Allied control councils, but also in eastern Europe and the Balkans, thousands of Russian soldiers have experienced a shock on coming into contact with peoples whose standards of living, while low compared to our own, are infinitely higher than those of Russia, especially now that its most advanced industrial areas have been devastated by the Germans. Returning soldiers bring back tales of their experiences, and their newly aroused aspirations for a fuller life may prove as explosive in the Russia of today as the new ideas brought back by the officers of Alexander I. from the Napoleonic campaigns.

TREND TOWARD MODERATION. But just as the Russians are learning that the rest of the world is not living, as they had been taught, exclusively like the characters of "The Grapes of Wrath," so Westerners are learning that Russia is not the paradise some of them had believed it to be. One reason for this is that the flower of the Russian armies perished on battlefields from Moscow to Stalingrad. The soldiers now seen in Europe often lack training and discipline. In a sense, it would have been better for the Communists if Russia's armed forces had never appeared in the flesh and if Russia had remained a myth. Now Westerners who might have been tempted to turn to communism have been disheartened to discover what they should have known: that the Russians are still a relatively backward

people, dazzled by Western civilization and often, for that reason, hostile to it; and that the political, social and economic system they developed out of their own needs and traditions, effective as it has proved in the U.S.S.R., is not applicable to the vastly different conditions of the Western world. It is significant that the countries of Europe closest to Russia geographically are the ones which have shown the strongest trend toward moderate political régimes, as in Hungary where the Small Landholders' party won nearly 60 per cent of the votes in the national elections of November 4, and in Austria, where the moderate People's Party and the Social Democrats decisively defeated the Communists even in industrial centers in the national elections of November 25. At the same time these elections, especially those held in Hungary, where the Russians alone are in control, offer striking evidence that the presence of Russian troops did not prevent free expression of public opinion. On the contrary, even anti-Soviet Hungarians outside the country readily concede that the elections of November 4 were the freest and most indicative of the true temper of the people to be held in Hungary since 1919. Whether or not Hungary and Austria can work out moderate political régimes in the midst of parlous economic conditions is a question the Big Three will have to answer through joint action.

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BRIDGING THE GAP. The gap between Russia and the West can be bridged if both we and the Russians succeed in rising above our respective fears and prejudices. Russia, following the example of the United States and Britain, is asserting itself in all continents, determined to act like a great power. It is just as idle for Mr. Attlee to call on Russia to present its final demands as it is for a man of mature years to ask an exuberant youth to formulate his final life plans. There is no finality in life; nor is there any reason to believe that the Western powers themselves want to stand still. The world is capable of effecting progressive reforms without aping Russia. Foreign Commissar Molotov acknowledged this in his references to Europe on the anniversary of the Russian revolution. The Western powers, for their part, should recognize that Russia has a contribution to make without necessarily adopting our political and economic institutions, which are alien to its experience.

We and the British cannot keep on asking Russia to clarify its intentions in Europe unless we clarify our own. We cannot keep on being merely against everything Russia wants in Europe. We must make up our minds what we are for. The British Labor party's victory has immeasurably strengthened the Social Democratic groups on the continent at the very moment when the appeal of communism is being weakened by Europe's direct contact with Russia's armed forces. This is the strategic moment for the United States to sustain the groups in Europe which share our ideas, instead of worrying about their tendency to control certain forms of private enterprise. At the same time, we should assure Russia that we are ready to aid its internal reconstruction and work with it in strengthening the economies of its neighbors in eastern Europe and the Balkans as the best assurance against the military resurgence of Germany. And we must give convincing evidence, as Secretary of State Byrnes said on October 31, that "America will never join any groups in those countries [adjoining Russia] in hostile intrigue against the Soviet Union." Such assurance is essential, because many groups in Europe remain convinced that the next war is just around the corner, and that it will be a war between Russia and the United States. Our political leaders should miss no opportunity to dispel this impression, which for some Europeans is a matter of deep anxiety, but for others a matter of alarmingly eager hope.


VERA MICHELES DEAN

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, Vol. XXV, No. 7, NOVEMBER 30, 1945. Published weekly by the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. National Headquarters, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y. FRANK ROSS MCCOY, *President*; DOROTHY F. LEBT, *Secretary*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*. Entered as second-class matter December 2, 1921, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Three Dollars a Year. Please allow at least one month for change of address on membership publications.

F. P. A. Membership (which includes the Bulletin), Five Dollars a Year

Produced under union conditions and composed and printed by union labor.

Washington News Letter



ISOLATIONISTS USE PEARL HARBOR TO ATTACK F.D.R. POLICIES

The special Congressional committee, which on November 15 began a public investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, could seriously harm the country by creating the impression that a simple explanation can be found for that catastrophe and the war which it started. Ten years ago another Congressional inquiry, the Nye Senate investigation of the munitions industry, weakened the nation by popularizing the false, sensational idea that extraneous considerations, such as bankers' desires to recover their loans and munitions makers' interest in promoting widespread consumption of their merchandise, sent us to war in 1917. By strengthening isolationist sentiment and inspiring the policy of statutory neutrality, the munitions investigation encouraged the Japanese to pursue the Asiatic adventure which led inevitably to Pearl Harbor and conflict with the United States.

ISSUE OF INVESTIGATION. The current inquiry has turned into an investigation of United States foreign policy in 1939, 1940 and 1941. Republican members seem to have been attracted by the false interpretation of pre-Pearl Harbor events, which holds that President Roosevelt, by truculent diplomacy, goaded the Japanese into attacking us. The special Army Board on Pearl Harbor provided some foundation for that thesis by stating on August 29 that the memorandum which Cordell Hull, then Secretary of State, handed to Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura and special envoy Saburo Kurusu on November 26, 1941 "hastened" the attack on Pearl Harbor. "It is possible that Hull pulled the trigger," Senator Ralph O. Brewster of Maine, one of the Republican members of the special Congressional committee, said on November 16.

Opposed to this greatly oversimplified explanation is the theory that the Pearl Harbor attack was the culmination of an aggressive policy undertaken by Japan at least ten years earlier with its invasion of Manchuria, and that the United States could have averted the attack only by sacrificing basic principles and interests. This is the contention of former Secretary Hull, who told the committee on November 23 that Kurusu had handed him an "ultimatum" on November 20, 1941, which required the United States, in order to settle Japanese-American differences, to give Japan a free hand in China and to supply Japan with whatever amount of oil it needed for the conduct of war. Acceptance of the Japanese

proposal "would have made the United States an ally of Japan," Mr. Hull said to the committee. "It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies."

The history of the period 1937-41 discloses that the United States maintained a temperate and restrained attitude toward Japan until the Japanese threat to fundamental American interests in Asia, developed over many years, became obvious; and that American public opinion, which insisted on mildness in 1937 when Japan attacked China, by 1939 was demanding that the United States stop its practice of selling scrap iron, copper and oil—essential war materials—to Japan. By signing the Tripartite Axis Alliance Treaty on September 27, 1940 Japan became a diplomatic partner of Germany at a time when the United States was developing a policy aimed at helping Britain "short of war" to defeat Germany. From April through September 1941, Roosevelt and Hull explored American-Japanese relations in talks with Ambassador Nomura. Two months before the memorandum of November 26, these talks had already made clear that the United States would not accept the policy Japan was pursuing in Asia and that Japan, for its part, would not abandon that policy.

As early as March 1941 Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka considered war with the United States a certainty. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg on November 23, 1945 received copies of a report on a secret discussion between Hitler and Matsuoka in Berlin on April 4, 1941. While stating that "Japan would do her utmost to avoid war with the United States," Matsuoka added that "he had always declared in his country he thought sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable if Japan continued to drift along as at present."

Although United States foreign policy now rests on commitments that completely repudiate pre-war isolationism, the suggestion that American rather than Japanese foreign policy brought about the attack on Pearl Harbor epitomizes the isolationist view that the United States can safely ignore developments on the other side of the oceans. Should that view now attract many who rejected it after Pearl Harbor, the authoritativeness of this country in its relations with other nations would be severely limited.

BLAIR BOLLES